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On the night of December 16, 2012, six men, including the
driver of a private bus, assaulted, gang raped, and threw a
23-year-old female paramedical intern from the moving bus
in New Delhi. After this shocking news became public,
thousands of Indians protested against the crime (IANS,2699 3020.
.in (R. Singh).
ian Institute of Management
Management Bangalore. Productio
3.12.0052012). While the nation was still debating whether the
justice system should be “fair” to the accused only (i.e.,
given one contradictory piece of evidence, the accused be
acquitted) or also to the victim who would remain stigma-
tised throughout her life (Indiresan, 2012), the victim died
on December 29, 2012. Similar public protests were staged
throughout the nation resulting in the formation of a judi-
cial committee to make new recommendations on the
criminal law for rape (PTI, 2013). One of the recommen-
dations was that the maximum punishment for rape should
be life imprisonment and not death penalty (Joshi, 2013).
However, the Criminal Law (Amendment) Ordinance 2013
provides death sentence in case of rape (PTI, 2013). Despite
the possibility of such a harsh punishment, cases of rape
from the nation continued to be reported in the media.
Worse still, another case of gang rape of a photojournalistn and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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whole nation, again provoking mass protests (Roy, 2013).
Both of the foregoing incidents and the resulting public
protests received a lot of media attention and stimulated
debates on the nature of social justice in India. The pro-
tests of the public suggested that many citizens were keen
to punish the offenders and raise voice against a deterio-
rating social order in India, particularly against rising crime
rates against women and the apathy of the police to restore
law and order. To the authors, these crimes against women
and the resulting public protests raised several interesting
questions that had remained uninvestigated so far. What
are the motivations of people in punishing the offender and
his groups? What is achieved by the public protests against
crimes? Are the motives behind and outcomes of public
protests the same in a country like America where social
order has been improving (The Associated Press, 2013) vs.
in India where social order has been deteriorating alarm-
ingly (Hafeez, 2013; Tilak, 2013)?
In the research reported in this article, we sought an-
swers to two important questions. (1) Why do people want
to punish (punishment goals) the perpetrators (an individ-
ual offender and his group of friends) of a severe crime
against a woman? (2) How is the effect of public protest on
the punishment goals pursued moderated by the prevailing
social order (i.e., crime and punishment rates at a partic-
ular point of time) and the country (India vs. America) of
the participants? To answer these questions, we relied on
the contemporary social-functionalist models of people as
principled theologians, prudent prosecutors, and prag-
matic politicians (Tetlock, 2002; Tetlock et al., 2007).
In the social-functionalist view, people have always
been living in interdependent collectives. For effective
functioning of their collectives, moreover, they have
developed accountability procedures:Who should report to
whom for what and under what circumstances? Examples of
the accountability procedures are the constitution of a
country, the laws of the land, religious scriptures, and so-
cial traditions. Since they are considered to be of tran-
scendental significance, members of the collective (a)
righteously protect them, (b) respond themselves to those
accountability demands, and (c) place those accountability
demands on others from time to time. It is the challenge of
the (a), (b), and (c) roles that turn people into intuitive
principled theologians, pragmatic politicians, and prudent
prosecutors, respectively.
Principled theologians rigidly defend the accountability
procedure to reiterate its sacred status; pragmatic politi-
cians, in contrast, conveniently take advantage of the
loopholes in the accountability procedure for their self-
interests. Between these extremes of rigidity and flexibility
vis-a-vis the accountability procedure lie prudent prose-
cutors. While placing accountability demands on others,
prudent prosecutors punish a wrongdoer to the extent they
can justify it to the collective. Stated differently, prudent
prosecutors punish wrongdoers to the extent they see social
order to be “. integral to their view of the way the world
either works, or the way they believe it should work”
(Skitka & Wisneski, 2012, p. 415). The option of cracking
down on wrongdoers sometimes by the way the society
works and sometimes by the way the society should work
makes prudent prosecutors appear as fair-but-biased-yet-correctible members of the collective (Tetlock et al.,
2007). To us, however, punishing a wrongdoer according
to the view of the way the collective functions and should
function reflects a compromise of the prosecutorial mind-
set with the flexible politician and rigid theologian ones,
respectively.
We hypothesised that public protests, as seen in the
aforementioned rape cases of New Delhi and Mumbai,
intensified the punishment goals with the offender. Goals to
punish can be victim-oriented, society-oriented, or both.
Retribution is a victim-oriented goal because it makes the
offender suffer relative to the harm inflicted on the victim
(Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002). In contrast, deter-
rence is a society-oriented goal because it prevents future
similar crimes in the society (Singh & Lin, 2011). Thus, our
Hypothesis 1 was that reasons for punishing an individual
offender should be represented by two correlated but
distinct goals of deterrence of and retribution for the
offender.
The prosecutorial mindset persists until the associate e
a person or group e of the offender is also expurgated
(Singh, Simons et al., 2012; Tetlock, Self, & Singh, 2010;
Zemba, Young, & Morris, 2006). In fact, the higher the
entitativity of the offender’s group (i.e., the perception
that it is a unified and coherent whole in which the
offender was bonded together in some way), the higher
the collective blame to it (Lickel, Schmader, & Hamilton,
2003). This strategy highlights the policing role that
other persons or groups of the offender’s social circle
might have played in enforcing the norms, a form of meta-
norm enforcement (Singh et al., 2011). Consistent with
this view, collective punishment was indeed harsher when
a group of the offender was accused of commission (i.e.,
either encouraged or benefitted from the wrongdoing)
than omission (i.e., failed to prevent the wrongdoing)
(Singh, Simons et al., 2012; Tetlock et al., 2010). Our
Hypothesis 2 was, therefore, that the reasons for punish-
ing an offender’s group should also be represented by two
correlated but distinct goals of deterrence of and omission
by the group.
While awareness of wrongdoing is sufficient to activate
the prosecutorial mindset, the deteriorating social order
(i.e., the combination of rising crime rate and declining
punishment rate) further accentuates such a mindset
(Tetlock et al., 2007). When the justice system also gives
priority to minimising Type 1 errors of convicting the
innocent, a large number of accused persons go unpun-
ished by the courts of law. That seemingly renders lives,
liberties, and properties of people rather unsafe in the
society. To uphold social order, therefore, prudent pros-
ecutors prefer minimising Type 2 errors of acquitting the
guilty as evinced by mass protests in New Delhi and
Mumbai. So, our Hypothesis 3 was that public protest
should heighten the goals of retribution for the offender
and omission by his group more when social order is
seemingly deteriorating than when it is unspecified. Spe-
cifically, the deteriorating social order and the public
protests are necessary for intensifying the pursuit of these
backward-looking goals.
While putting accountability demands on others, pru-
dent prosecutors always keep other people, institutions,
and the broader political and national environment in their
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tween Eastern and Western nations are thus of direct
relevance for the present issue. First, Easterners in general
(Chiu, Morris, Hong, & Menon, 2000; Menon, Morris, Chiu, &
Hong, 1999) and Indians in particular (Miller, 1984) explain
deviant acts of an individual person more by situation than
disposition (i.e., he or she is that kind of person). In
contrast, Westerners in general and Americans in particular
explain deviant acts more by the disposition of an individual
person than his situation (Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan,
1999). Consequently, the individual person is held less
morally accountable by Easterners than Westerners (Singh
et al., 2011; Singh, Tetlock et al., 2012). Second, crimes
against women have been rather rising in India (Hafeez,
2013; Tilak, 2013) but sharply declining in the United
States (The Associated Press, 2013) since 2010. This na-
tional difference in norm-enforcement suggests that the
view of the way the society works should be less positive
among Indians than Americans. In general, therefore, the
prosecutorial stance of the former may be driven by their
view of the way the society functions (i.e., what is practical
to a politician?) but that of the latter by their view of the
way the society should function (i.e., what is sacred to a
theologian?).
Given the foregoing views of the individual person as
more constrained than his groups and of the law-
enforcement as looser in India than America, our Hypoth-
esis 4 was that the public protest effects on deterrence of
and retribution for the individual offender should be
stronger among Indians than Americans. Without public
protest, Indians should pursue the two goals less vigorously
than Americans. Given information about public protest
against a crime, however, Indians, like pragmatic politi-
cians, should pursue both of the ideal goals on par with
theologian Americans. Put simply, the public protest effect
should hold with Indians but not with Americans.
The two earlier mentioned EasteWest differences also
led us to predict that the public protest effect on deter-
rence of the offender’s group should be stronger among
Indians than Americans. Easterners usually hold the groups
of an individual person more accountable than do West-
erners (Chao, Zhang, & Chiu, 2008; Chiu et al., 2000;
Menon et al., 1999; Zemba et al., 2006), and more so to
the groups high rather than low in entitativity (Singh
et al., 2011; Singh, Simons et al., 2012). Thus, our Hy-
pothesis 5 was that the goal of deterrence of group should
be pursued more by Indians than Americans even when
there is no public protest but much more strongly by the
former than the latter when there are public protests
against the crime. Stated simply, the pre-existing, more
favourable inclination of Indians than Americans towards
meta-norm enforcement should be further accentuated by
public protest.
In summary, we tested five hypotheses. Hypotheses 1
and 2 pertained to the two-factor measurement
models of punishment goals; Hypothesis 3 specified the
moderation of the causal effects of public protest on the
past-oriented punishment goals of retribution for the
offender and omission by the group; and Hypotheses 4 and 5
specified moderation of the public protest effect
on deterrence of and retribution for the offender
and deterrence of the group by country of the participants.Method
Participants
Undergraduate psychology students from the State of Bihar
in India and the State of Colorado in the United States of
America (NsZ 64) participated. Each sample had 32 males
and 32 females who randomly received one of the four
crime vignettes (ns Z 8) described below.
Vignettes
In our crime vignettes, a male offender (Person Z) and his
group of friends were accused of snatching an elderly lady’s
handbag (Singh, Tetlock et al., 2012). Specifically, Person Z
noticed an elderly lady with an unattended handbag at the
food court of a mall and decided to snatch it. While doing
so, the lady resisted and was pushed away by the offender.
Consequently, she “fell and knocked her head on the edge
of a chair. fractured her skull. suffered a serious
concussion, and had to be hospitalized for one month”
costing a lot (US$10,000 or Indian Rs. 500,000). We chose
this level of consequence for the victim to make high
severity of the crime committed rather salient. Person Z
was caught by several bystanders when he tried to run and
was handed over to the police.
Although Person Z’s friends were ignorant of his plan,
they failed to (i) prevent the individual person from
committing the offence and (ii) catch and hand him over to
the police. Such lapses usually render the group account-
able by the error of omission of the policing duty (Lickel
et al., 2003; Singh, Simons et al., 2012).
Notably, the offender intended and committed the crime,
but his friends were merely present at the site. Such manip-
ulations of the criminal intention and action by the offender
and association of the group of friends with the offender
(Heider, 1958) were ideal for distinguishing norm enforce-
ment with the offender (Singh, Tetlock et al., 2012) from
meta-norm enforcement with the group (Singh et al., 2011;
Singh, Simons et al., 2012). According to the model of intui-
tive prosecutors, moreover, it is easier to detect differences
in punitive reactions in themoderate cases than the extreme
ones (Tetlock et al., 2007). So, we used the offence of
snatching an elderly lady’s handbag at a public place instead
of the hotly debated offence of the gang rape of a young
woman, in the media and the primetime debates.
We manipulated (a) the prevailing social order in the
locality and (b) the resulting public protest against the
crime across the four vignettes by supplying different sets
of information. To manipulate social order, for example, we
omitted information about crime and punishment rates in
two vignettes (unspecified ) but added information that “.
the cases of crime against women have lately been rising,
and most of those accused went rather unpunished by the
court” (deteriorating) in two vignettes. Likewise, we
omitted information about public response to the crime in
two vignettes (no public protest) but reported that “.
people supporting rights and security of women came out
on the streets in mass, demanding that justice be done for
both the victim and the women in general” for the next 3
consecutive days (public protest).
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The design was a 2  2  2 (Country of the participants:
Indian vs. American  Social order: unspecified vs.
deteriorating  Public protest: no vs. yes) between-
participants factorial. The first factor of country was
quasi-experimental; the last two factors were fully rando-
mised (ns Z 16 per cell).
Procedure
In a study of citizens’ reactions to crime reports, partici-
pants read one of the foregoing four vignettes in English,
distributed randomly among them, and made a number of
judgements along 9-point Likert-type scales. Responses
were anonymous.
The initial judgements were taken to check on the suc-
cess of the manipulations. The severity items asked for
seriousness of the lady’s hurt (1 Z not at all;
9Z extremely seriously) and expensiveness of her medical
treatment (1 Z not at all; 9 Z extremely expensive). For
assessing social order, we used two items about crime (has
the crime rate been uncontrollable lately in the society?)
and punishment (has the society been unsuccessful in
punishing those involved in crimes?) rates. Responses were
made along 9-point scales, anchored by 1 (strongly
disagree) and 9 (strongly agree). We also checked whether
people were concerned with the crime (1 Z not at all
concerned; 9 Z extremely concerned ).
We told the participants that most nations put criminals
behind the bars, a form of punishment that deprives them
of their individual liberties. We then asked, “Why would
you punish the offender and his group of friends?” Partici-
pants responded to the measures of the punishment goals
of deterrence (two items) and of retribution (four items)
reported in Table 1. The items for the offender were guided
by the findings of Singh and Lin (2011). We measured the
punishment goals of deterrence of and omission by the
group with two sets of three items listed in Table 2. The
items were randomised in the original questionnaire. We
report them in Tables 1 and 2 according to the factor they
formed. The endorsement of each reason was again made
along a 9-point scale, anchored by 1 (strongly disagree) and
9 (strongly agree).
Participants worked at their own pace, and completed
the task within 30 min. Each session ended with a full
debriefing.Table 1 Standardised regression weights of the reasons for puni
Reasons for punishing the offender
Factor 1: Retribution
1: .to make sure that punishment for Person Z was proportiona
2: .to make him experience some of the sufferings he inflicted
3: .Person Z to compensate the victim for the harms he inflicte
4: .to make sure that Person Z got what he deserved.
Factor 2: Deterrence
5: .to make sure that Person Z never does anything like this aga
6: .to make sure that other people never do anything like what
Note. All statements started with “I wanted .”.Results
Manipulation checks
Severity of crime
Responses to the questions about (a) seriousness of the
lady’s hurt and (b) expensiveness of her medical treatment
formed a highly reliable scale (SpearmaneBrown Z .85).
Thus, we formed the severity measure by averaging the two
responses (9 Z highest severity). The obtained mean of
7.20 (SD Z 2.06) was significantly higher than the nominal
neutral point of 5 on the response measure, t(127)Z 12.10,
p < .001, showing that the severe crime against the woman
was indeed perceived as such.
Public protest
We performed a 2  2  2 (Country  Social order  Public
protest) between-participants analysis of variance (ANOVA)
on the perceived measure of public concern. Participants
perceived a greater level of public concern with the crime
when the information about public protest was supplied
(MZ 7.28, SDZ 1.61) than when it was omitted (MZ 6.63,
SD Z 2.12) in the vignettes, F(1,120) Z 4.38, p Z .04,
h2p Z .04. This manipulation was equally successful with
both national groups, F(1,120) Z 2.54, p Z .11, h2p Z .02.
Participants also perceived a greater level of public
concern with the crime when the social order was deteri-
orating (MZ 7.56, SDZ 1.49) than when it was unspecified
(M Z 6.34, SD Z 2.08) in the vignettes, F(1,120) Z 15.10,
p < .001, h2pZ .11. This difference was also uniform across
national groups, F(1,120) Z .16, p Z .69.
Both the Social order  Public protest effect,
F(1,120) Z 0.01, p Z .92, and the three-way interaction
effect, F(1,120) Z 3.22, p Z .08, h2p Z .03, were statisti-
cally non-significant. Clearly, then, perception of the
manipulated public concern with the crime was indepen-
dent of the remaining two factors in the design.
Social order
To check the perception of the existing social order in the
two national groups of participants in the condition of un-
specified social order, we first performed a 2  2
(Country  Rates: crime vs. punishment) ANOVA, with
repeated measurements on the second factor. The left
graph of Figure 1 displays the mean responses to the un-
controllable crime and unsuccessful punishment items.
Both means of Americans are uniformly lower than those ofshing the individual offender on the two hypothesised factors.
Factor 1 Factor 2
te to his crime. .63
on the victim. .45
d. .46
.78
in. .63
Person Z did. .74
Table 2 Standardised regression weights of the reasons for punishing the offender’s group on the two hypothesised factors.
Reasons for punishing the offender’s group of friends Factor 1 Factor 2
Factor 1: Deterrence
1: .sure that Person Z’s group never does anything like this again. .70
2: .sure that other groups never do anything like this again. .96
3: .them realise that they have to live by the same rules. .60
Factor 2: Omission
4: .misconduct of Person Z was very much their business. .73
5: .they made the lives and properties unsafe in the society. .91
6: .they could have prevented Z from doing what he did? .60
Note. The first three statements started with “I wanted to make .” and the last three with “I wanted them to realise that .”.
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the unspecified social order was viewed more positively in
the United States than in India.
We performed another similar ANOVA for the condition
of deteriorating social order to check the effectiveness of
the manipulation. The four means from this ANOVA are
displayed in the right graph of Figure 1. Whereas both
groups saw the high crime rate uniformly, F(1,62) Z 0.26,
p Z .61, Americans found the declining punishment rate
more alarming than did Indians, F(1,62)Z 25.70, p < .001,
h2p Z .29.
In separate 2  2 (Country  Social order) between-
participants ANOVAs of the crime and punishment rate re-
sponses, there were significant interaction effects,
Fs(1,124) Z 4.20 and 35.16, respectively, ps Z .04 and
.001, h2ps Z .03 and .22. They arose because Indians
perceived decline in the crime rate from the unspecified
(M Z 7.97, SD Z 1.98) to the deteriorating (M Z 6.59,
SDZ 1.72) condition, F(1,62) Z 8.82, p Z .004, h2p Z .13,
but no change in the punishment rate (MZ 3.41, SDZ 2.09
vs. M Z 4.00, SD Z 1.74), F(1,62) Z 1.52, p Z .22,
h2p Z .02. By contrast, Americans perceived decline in theFigure 1 Mean perceived crime and punishment rates by
Indian and American participants when social order was un-
specified (left panel) and deteriorating (right panel). The
higher the means, the higher the uncontrollability of crimes
and the unsuccessfulness in punishing the accused.punishment rate from the unspecified (M Z 2.00,
SD Z 1.34) to the deteriorating (M Z 6.59, SD Z 1.72)
condition, F(1,62) Z 94.42, p < .001, h2p Z .60, but no
change in the crime rate (M Z 6.41, SD Z 1.99 vs.
M Z 6.38, SD Z 1.70), F(1,62) Z 0.01, p Z .95, h2p Z .00.
Such evidence of more attention to the changing crime
rates among Indians but more attention to the changing
punishment rate among Americans hints at their respective
views of the way the society functions and should function.
Tests of the two-goal measurement models
Hypothesis 1. To test the two-factor model of the re-
sponses to six reasons for punishing the offender, we per-
formed a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) in AMOS. Table
1 reports the standardised regression weights of the six
reasons for punishing the offender on the two hypothesised
factors. Whereas the first four items constituted the pun-
ishment goal of retribution; the last two items constituted
the punishment goal of deterrence. The fit of the hypoth-
esised model to the data was good, c2(8)Z 13.27, pZ .11,
non-normed fit index/TuckereLewis Index (NNFI/
TLI) Z .93, incremental fit index (IFI) Z .96, root mean
square error of approximation (RMSEA)Z .07, standardised
mean root residual (SRMR) Z .05. Constraining the factors
to be the same resulted in a worse fit to the data,
c2(9) Z 22.91, p Z .006, NNFI/TLI Z .82, IFI Z .90,
RMSEA Z .11, SRMR Z .07. Since the first c2 was signifi-
cantly smaller than the second one, c2D(1)Z 9.64, pZ .01,
we accepted Hypothesis 1.
Responses to the items constituting the factors of
retribution (Cronbach alpha (a) Z .67) and deterrence
(SpearmaneBrown Z .62) seemed reliable. Thus, we
averaged the four responses to the retribution goal and the
two responses to the deterrence goal to form the two
respective measures. The correlation between the two
goals was positive, r(126) Z .40, p < .01.
Hypothesis 2. We performed a similar CFA on the six re-
sponses to the group of friends. Table 2 reports the stand-
ardised regressionweights of the six reasons for punishing the
group on the two hypothesised factors. Evidently, the first
three responses constituted the punishment goal of deter-
rence, but the remaining three responses constituted the
punishment goal of omission. The fit of the two-factor model
to the data was good, c2(8) Z 11.81, p Z .16, NNFI/
TLI Z .98, IFI Z .99, RMSEA Z .06, SRMR Z .04. When we
Public protest and punishment goals 87tested an alternative single-factor model with the data, the
fit was poor, c2(9) Z 72.70, p Z .001, NNFI/TLI Z .63,
IFIZ .78, RMSEAZ .24, SRMRZ .09. Given a smaller c2 for
the hypothesised model than the alternative single-factor
model, c2D(1)Z 60.89, pZ .001, we accepted Hypothesis 2.
Responses to the three items of deterrence (a Z .78)
and those to the three items of omission by the group
(a Z .79) were highly reliable. Hence, we averaged the
three responses to the deterrence goal and the three re-
sponses to the omission goal to form the two respective
measures. The correlation between the two goals was
positive, r(126) Z .52, p < .01.Figure 2 The moderation of the public protest effects on
retribution for the offender (left panel) and omission by the
group (right panel) by social order. Notably, both of these
backward-looking goals were pursued most when the social
order was described as deteriorating and people had staged
mass protests.Tests of the causal hypotheses
In preliminary ANOVAs, there was no effect of the gender of
the participants on any of the four aforementioned pun-
ishment goals. Accordingly, we did not include gender as a
factor in any of the analyses reported below.
Hypotheses 3, 4, and 5 predicted (i) an overall two-way
interaction effect in ANOVA, and (ii) a specific pattern of
differences among the four simple effects of the interac-
tion effect. Therefore, we first performed separate three-
factor ANOVAs for the four punishment goals. When the
predicted interaction effect was statistically significant
(pZ .05), we further tested the simple effect of one factor
at a particular level of another factor.
Hypothesis 3. The Social order  Public protest effect
was statistically significant for the past-oriented punish-
ment goals of retribution for the offender, F(1,120)Z 4.84,
p Z .03, h2p Z .04, and omission by the group,
F(1,120) Z 7.60, p Z .007, h2p Z .06. We present the
profiles of the first and second interaction effects in the
respective left and right panels of Figure 2.
Consistent with Hypothesis 3, the retribution goal with
the offender was pursued most vehemently when public
protest had occurred in the condition of deteriorating social
order. Thus, the same social order, which was of no
consequence in the condition of no public protest,
F(1,60) Z 0.05, p Z .82, made a drastic difference in the
condition of public protest, F(1,60) Z 10.95, p Z .002,
h2p Z .35. The public protest effect was absent when the
social order was unspecified, F(1,60) Z 1.58, p Z .21,
h2pZ .03, but marginally present when the social order was
deteriorating, F(1,60) Z 3.40, p Z .07, h2p Z .05. Collec-
tively, these results make social order a reliable moderator
of the public protest effect.
Essentially, the same trends are present in omission by
the group in the right panel of Figure 2. While no public
protest eliminated the effect of social order,
F(1,60)Z 1.75, pZ .19, h2pZ .02, public protest magnified
the effect of social order by five times, F(1,60) Z 6.90,
p Z .01, h2p Z .10. Again, the public protest effect was
present when the social order was deteriorating,
F(1,60) Z 4.93, pZ .03, h2pZ .06, but absent when it was
unspecified, F(1,60) Z 2.85, p Z .10, h2p Z .03.
In sum, the pursuit of the past-oriented punishment
goals of retribution for the offender and omission by the
group was intensified only when both the deteriorating
social order and the public protest against the crime were
present. So, we accepted Hypothesis 3.Hypothesis 4. As predicted, the Country of the
participants  Public protest effect was statistically sig-
nificant for the punishment goals of deterrence of,
F(1,120) Z 7.32, p Z .008, h2p Z .06, and retribution for,
F(1,120) Z 7.93, p Z .006, h2p Z .06, the offender. We
present the profiles of the interaction effect on the
deterrence and retribution goals in the left and centre
panels of Figure 3, respectively.
It can be seen that both of these punishment goals with
the offender were pursued at the high level by Americans
independent of public protest, Fs(1,60)Z 1.93 and 2.76 for
deterrence and retribution, respectively, ps > .10,
h2ps < .03. By contrast, both goals were pursued more
vehemently by Indians when there was public protest than
when there was no public protest, Fs(1,60) Z 5.48 and
5.39, psZ .02, h2psZ .08. Notably, the locus of the country
difference was in the condition of no public protest,
Fs(1,60) Z 8.40 and 4.79 for deterrence and retribution,
respectively, ps < .03, h2psZ .07. In the condition of public
protest, Indians pursued the two goals at the same ideal
level as did Americans, Fs(1,60) Z 0.44 and 3.15 for
deterrence and retribution, respectively, ps > .08,
h2ps < .05.
Hypothesis 5. Deterrence of group also yielded a sig-
nificant Country of the participants  Public protest ef-
fect, F(1,120) Z 7.09, p Z .009, h2p Z .06. The rightmost
panel of Figure 3 exhibits the profile of this interaction
effect.
Again, public protest was effective with Indians,
F(1,60)Z 5.53, pZ .02, h2pZ .08, but not with Americans,
F(1,60) Z 2.23, p Z .14, h2p Z .04. Moreover, as predicted
by the agency hypothesis of groups (Chiu et al., 2000;
Menon et al., 1999), public protest led to a higher level of
deterrence of group among Indians than Americans,
F(1,60) Z 6.51, p Z .01, h2p Z .10. Contrary to the same
agency hypothesis, there was no difference between the
two groups in the condition of no public protest,
Figure 3 The moderation of the public protest effects on deterrence of (left panel) and retribution for the offender (centre
panel) and omission by the group (right panel) by the country of the participants. Evidently, Indians, not Americans, responded to
the manipulated public protest against the crime.
88 R. Singh et al.F(1,60) Z 1.74, p Z .27, h2p Z .02. Taken together, these
results support moderation of the public protest effect on
deterrence of group by country but raises doubt on the
agency explanation for why people of Easterner and
Westerner nations behave differently towards groups.
Discussion
Evidence for the two-factor structure of the punishment
goals to be pursued in cases of crimes against women was
necessary before testing our three causal hypotheses about
how the public protest effect is moderated by social order
and country. We thus first tested two hypotheses about the
two-factor structure of punishment goals with the offender
and with his group of friends. As hypothesised, the reasons
for punishing the offender and his group were concerns
with (a) the victim-oriented goal of retributive justice
(Skitka & Wisneski, 2012) and (b) the society-oriented goal
of future safety (i.e., deterrence) (Singh & Lin, 2011).
Retribution for the offender makes him suffer physically
and/or financially like the victim; retribution for the group,
however, entails censoring it for disregarding the policing
duty expected of the group members of the offender (Singh
et al., 2011; Singh, Simons et al., 2012). Our evidence for
the punishment goals of deterrence and retribution agrees
with the established legal literature (Hart, 1961), and that
of censoring the group for omission lends cross-national
generality to an emerging form of collective sanction
(Levinson, 2003; Lickel et al., 2003). In the social-func-
tionalist view, therefore, stressing omission by the group of
the offender “. is a rational prosecutorial strategy to
stimulate mutual accountability among group members.”(Tetlock, 2002, p. 464) instead of “. meddling in others’
privacy or business.” (Singh, Simons et al. 2012, p. 276) as
is commonly believed.
Support for Hypothesis 3 presents a universal moderator
of the public protest effect: Both Indians and Americans
were harshest with the offender and his group for the
respective misdeed and omission only when the deterio-
rating social order was followed by mass protests on the
streets. This demonstration for the necessity of deterio-
rating social order for an effective public protest lends
further validation to the finding that while awareness of
wrongdoing is sufficient to activate the prosecutorial
mindset, the deteriorating social order (i.e., the combina-
tion of rising crime rate and declining conviction rate) is
also necessary and no less important (Tetlock et al., 2007).
In fact, the pursuit of the retribution and omission goals
were highest only when public protest was followed by
deteriorating social order.
The foregoing finding reminds us of Durkheim’s (1925/
1976) account of collective reactions to law-violations.
The public does get emotionally charged when their way
of life is condemned but relieved when those who put
themselves above the victims and the laws of the land are
censored and punished. Considered from this vantage
point, public protests in New Delhi and Mumbai were in-
stances of making sure of retributive justice (Skitka &
Wisneski, 2012) in India. According to Sen (2005), voice
“is a crucial component of the pursuit of social justice” (p.
xiii). We agree with him, adding further that even public
protest, an extreme form of voice, is most effective in the
pursuit of social justice only when the social order is also
under siege.
Public protest and punishment goals 89As predicted, we obtained evidence for country-specific
differences in responses to public protests. In particular,
Americans pursued the deterrence and retribution goals
equally regardless of public concern with the crime. In-
dians, in contrast, pursued both of these goals more
vehemently when there was public protest than when there
was no public concern. Such differences illustrate the
country-specific components of the public protest effect,
supporting our hypothesis of moderation by country.
Our EasteWest differences in the pursuit of deterrence
and retribution goals with the offender were confined to the
condition of no public protest. This finding agrees with the
hypothesis of cultural difference in the agency of individual
persons (Chiu et al., 2000; Menon et al., 1999). The same
agency hypothesis also correctly predicted that Indians,
relative to Americans, would endorse deterrence of the
group more when there was public protest. However, the
agency hypothesis failed to explain no-country difference in
deterring the group in the condition of no public protest.
There may be two reasons for this anomaly in the support for
Hypothesis 5. First, the agency hypothesis may be restricted
to the assignment of responsibility and punishment across
countries (Singh et al., 2011; Singh, Tetlock et al., 2012).
Second, andmore important, thoughts about thepunishment
goals may have activated concern for protecting sacred
values of the society, a point we had raised in the introduc-
tion about how the society functions and should function.
That Americans pursued the deterrence and retribution
goals regardless of public concern reflects on their value
concern as to how the society should function. Accordingly,
they protected those sacred values of deterrence and
retribution from encroachments by temporary ups and
downs in the society. Because theologians are challenged
by the question of fundamental right vs. wrong for the
community as a whole (Skitka & Wisneski, 2012; Tetlock,
2002), they might have been protecting the sacred goals
of deterrence and retribution like principled theologians.
By contrast, Indians might have been caught between how
the society functions and how it should function. In the
absence of public concern, they found it to be practical by
going along with how the society actually functions. Given
public protests, however, they engaged themselves in an
internal dialogue about what is right vs. wrong for the so-
ciety and how women’s security might be achieved. Such
flexibility in responding to public concern portrays them as
pragmatic politicians who give top priority to making a
positive self-presentation (Singh, Choo, & Poh.1998;
Tetlock, 2002) and following what is collectively
acceptable.
An alternate explanation may be that Indians, who are
now used to deteriorating governance, have begun to accept
the social reality as they perceive it to be. Even when
awareness of wrongdoing does activate a prosecutorial
mindset in them, they translate it into punitive action in only
milder ways. However, public protests rouse them from this
state of tolerance to seeking social justice by punishing the
perpetrators. Given the growing power of the Internet and
social media in awakening citizens, we predict that Indians
canalso beexpected tobeprincipled theologianswith regard
to the rights and safety of women in India in the near future.
Regardless of whether prudent prosecutors of the two
countries assumed a principled theologian or pragmaticpolitician posture, our research convincingly showed that
public protest leads Indians to pursue punishment goals at
the ideal level. An important implication of this finding is
for public policy about safety of women through punish-
ment systems. People in general and the courts of law in
particular try to achieve twin goals of social control and
fairness with the accused (Singh, Ramasamy, Self, Simons,
& Lin, 2013). The former goal requires strict application
of the law to minimise Type II errors of acquitting the
guilty; the latter requires due consideration of the exten-
uating factors to minimise Type I errors of convicting the
innocent. As we noted in the introduction, minimising of
Type I error is achieved by overweighting of any evidence
against the guilt of the perpetrators. The resulting low
conviction rate not only leads to disillusionment of the
public with the governance of the land but also provokes
them to resort to mass protests. Given the waste of time
and money over management of mass protests, it seems
necessary to make punishment certain and fast but not
necessarily harsh (Indiresan, 2012). Lay people hold an
accused person and his groups accountable if any one of the
four criteria of association, commission, foreseeability,
and intention is applicable to them (Heider, 1958). To make
punishment certain in India, therefore, it may be proper
now to convict any accused if he or she meets any one of
these four criteria of culpability. After all, our participants
punished the offender’s group of friends simply because of
its association with him.Acknowledgements
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